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COMMENTARY
Six years later, the need for the
Iran nuclear deal is as strong as
ever
Reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal  is  the quickest  way to address the Middle
Eastern nation’s deep economic woes. Yet broader cooperation and engagement
with the West on other issues seems unlikely under President-elect Raisi. The EU
must facilitate the parties’ return to the deal or risks �nding a nuclear Iran on its
doorstep.
In  an  election  marred  by  the  mass  disquali�cation  of  moderate  candidates  and
widespread apathy, hard-liner cleric Ebrahim Raisi won Iran’s presidential ballot on 18
June. While the country faces many challenges, Raisi’s priority is to improve Iran’s dire
economic situation. He can only achieve this through sanctions relief.
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Restoring  the 2015 nuclear  deal,  the  Joint  Comprehensive  Plan of  Action (JCPOA),  is
crucial. But beyond this, Raisi has no interest in pursuing broader cooperation with the
West. Instead, he aims to �rm up regional security and economic ties and strengthen
Iran’s pivot to the East, particularly China.
A one-horse race
The  election  was  engineered  to  favour  Raisi.  Only  7  of  the  592  candidates  were
approved. All notable moderate and reformist runners were rejected by the Guardian
Council, a 12-member body of clerics and jurists close to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
This  rejection can be explained by the paramount change on the horizon:  Ayatollah
Khamenei’s succession. He wants �rm, conservative control of all of Iran’s branches of
power for when that moment comes. Raisi’s election achieves that.
Yet, for many people both inside and outside of Iran, Raisi is a tainted individual due to
his  appalling  human  rights  record.  He  is  notorious  for  his  involvement
(https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-57421235) in the execution of thousands
of political prisoners in the late 1980s. He is also under US sanctions for human rights
abuses since 2019 because of his role in a brutal government crackdown following the
November 2019 protests.
What next?
Raisi  will  replace the outgoing,  moderate Hassan Rouhani in August while Iran faces
enormous  socio-economic  challenges,  including  high  in�ation  and  spiralling
unemployment.  Getting  the economy back on track  is  critical  to  relieve  the citizens’
widespread grievances.
Former US President Donald Trump’s maximum pressure campaign of sanctions had a
devastating economic impact on Iran, seriously impeding its trade, �nancial access and
oil  exports.  Internally,  government  mismanagement  and corruption has  also  been a
heavy burden on the economy, which COVID-19 only exacerbated (https://www.epc.eu
/en/publications/How-Iran-was-hit-by-and-could-overcome-the-COVID-19-crisis~330a68).
As a result, many middle-class Iranians now live in poverty (https://www.ft.com/content
/520b54e4-c793-4e7d-84f5-03f71587532d).
But unlike Rouhani,  Raisi  is  sceptical  that economic integration with the West would
strengthen the economy. He fears that this path would weaken the foundational pillars
of the Iranian Revolution.
Raisi will likely follow a two-pronged approach: back Khamenei’s vision of self-su�ciency
by establishing a ‘resistance economy’ (https://www.foreigna�airs.com/articles/middle-
east/2021-03-17/dilemma-irans-resistance-economy)  that  maximises  Iran’s  internal
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capabilities;  and  build  on  Rouhani’s  policy  of  expanding  trade  relations  with
neighbouring states (i.e. Russia, Turkey, Iraq) and the East.
More speci�cally,  deeper economic cooperation with China, as laid out in the recent
Iran–China  25-year  cooperation  agreement  (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-
china-idUSKBN2BJ0AD), will be a priority, along with strengthening ties with India.
Same old foreign policy
Foreign  policy  is  not  an  area  where  the  president  has  signi�cant  in�uence  in  Iran.
Instead, power lies with Khamenei and the security establishment. Continuity in Iran’s
foreign policy is most likely. For example, its regional activity via its allies and proxies is
unlikely  to change.  Raisi  stresses the importance of  regional  ties and is  expected to
continue bilateral discussions to lower tensions in the neighbourhood, particularly with
Saudi Arabia.
Iran’s long border with Afghanistan places it on the frontline of warfare spillover and a
refugee crisis triggered by the US pull-out. Therefore, Iran is taking a pivotal role in the
process of dialogue between di�erent factions in Afghanistan.
Now that Iran’s political, security and religious leadership are united in conservatism,
even Tehran’s regional in�uence could be strengthened. Raisi carries more weight in the
Supreme National Security Council and the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
than his predecessor and therefore has more capacity to make concessions to Iran’s
regional opponents, for example.
Resuscitating the nuclear deal
Raisi  is  deeply  suspicious  of  the  West,  particularly  the  US.  However,  as  Iran  needs
sanctions relief urgently, the president-elect favours a revival of the JCPOA. It is also in
the US’ national security interests to put the nuclear issue back in the box. Otherwise, a
nuclear-armed Iran would create greater instability in the Middle East, including with
Israel.
Since Trump pulled the plug in  2018,  a  resumption of  the deal  has been underway
following Joe Biden’s election in January 2021. A seventh round of talks is supposed to
kick o� shortly in Vienna. If successful, the US sanctions will be lifted and Iran’s nuclear
programme  scaled  down.  Tehran  is  now  enriching  uranium  up  to  63%  purity
(https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-has-enriched-uranium-up-63-purity-
iaea-report-says-2021-05-11/) – its highest ever rate – and producing enriched uranium
metal  (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-informs-iaea-plans-produce-
enriched-uranium-2021-07-06/). This is likely part of Iran’s negotiating strategy.
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Progress has been made to return to the nuclear deal, but the process is long. Despite
the  Supreme  Leader  supporting  the  revival  of  the  JCPOA,  the  hard-line  Iranian
Parliament  (https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/06/irans-rouhani-blames-hard-
liners-deadlock-us), full of Rouhani critics, has been obstructive. The US is also yet to
meet Iran’s demand for guarantees that it will not upend the deal once again.
Finalising negotiations before Raisi’s  24 August  inauguration is  still  feasible.  Rouhani
wants to sign the deal  to cement his legacy.  The hard-liners may forbid a moderate
president from signing a deal but would play ball  if  it  is  one of their own. For Raisi,
signing  a  last-minute  Rouhani-led  deal  may  be  the  best  option.  He  could  reap  the
bene�ts while blaming any faults on his predecessor.  He would also not be seen as
having compromised with the West.
If a deal cannot be �nalised by August, Raisi will assemble a new negotiating team. While
who  would  make  the  cut  is  still  unclear,  they  could  be  individuals  with  little  to  no
international experience in management or negotiations. In fact, Raisi himself has no
such  experience.  This  would  impact  the  dynamics  of  the  process  and  the  future
implementation of a deal.
Europe must choose its battles
The E3 (France, Germany, the UK) and the EU – particularly the European External Action
Service (EEAS) – have played a critical role in keeping the JCPOA alive. European shuttle
diplomacy  between  Washington  and  Tehran  has  been  crucial,  particularly  given
Washington’s  reluctance to  engage in  direct  talks.  Rouhani  and his  foreign minister,
Mohammad Javad Zarif, engage with their European counterparts frequently. Creating
the same dynamic with a new team in Tehran will be challenging.
Even though Iran perceives Europe as the lesser of two transatlantic evils, establishing
trust  and  similar  channels  for  talks  to  the  same  extent  will  take  time  and  require
engagement from EU High Representative Josep Borrell  and the EEAS. Raisi’s  human
rights record may repulse European leaders, but they must keep their eyes on the prize
of securing the deal.
The EU should also be realistic about the future level of EU–Iran economic cooperation.
European companies are not as prepared to re-enter Iran as they were in 2015. The
Trump experience made EU investors feel that the nuclear deal and sanctions relief are
fragile and that they could get burned again if the deal falls apart once more.
The EU should continue to �ag the importance of multilateral dialogue in deescalating
tensions and rivalries  in  this  region.  This  can enhance the Union’s  position within a
framework  of  cooperation  that  addresses  Iran’s  regional  behaviour,  especially  if  the
latter’s talks with other Gulf countries advance. The Iranian leadership might not dismiss
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such a framework, which could help all parties in the region reach a collective security
agreement in the Persian Gulf.
There  is  an  opportunity  for  the  EU  to  grasp  an  important  role  (https://www.epc.eu
/en/Publications/Stepping-into-the-drivers-seat-The-EU-should-double-down-on-
USIran~3c16d0) in this troubled regional security and political environment. Brokering
the nuclear deal and fostering regional multilateral cooperation is where the EU can add
value. But, as the new leadership changes in Iran show, time is running out. The longer
the EU takes to reinforce its position, the more di�cult it will be to in�uence and shape.
JCPOA+?
Both Washington and Brussels hoped to strike “a longer and stronger” follow-on accord
(https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-19/blinken-promises-diplomacy-
with-humility-in-rebuke-of-trump) than the original deal would allow. This would include
extending the enrichment caps and veri�cation system in Iran’s nuclear programme and
addressing Tehran’s ballistic missile programme and support for proxies in the Middle
East.  However,  in  his  �rst  post-election  press  conference
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-consent/?next_url=https%3a%2f
%2fwww.washingtonpost.com%2fworld%2f2021%2f06%2f21%2�ran-nuclear-power-
plant-bushehr%2f),  Raisi  ruled  out  any  possibility  of  concessions  on  Iran’s  ballistic
missiles and its support for regional proxies and allies. Tehran views them as crucial
deterrents against its neighbourhood foes.
Furthermore,  there is  little  hope for  progress  in  areas like  human rights,  people-to-
people  contacts,  and  cultural  and  academic  exchanges  between Iran  and  the  West.
Conservatives  like  Raisi  view  such  engagement  as  an  invitation  to  hostile  cultural
in�ltration  (https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/06/24/how-europe-will-deal-with-
irans-new-president/) that would erode the values of the Islamic Republic.
Nevertheless, it is important to bank the JCPOA, even without additional agreements,
since it provides important safeguards on Iran’s nuclear programme. The strategic logic
behind signing a nuclear deal is as valid today as it was in 2015. Without it, Iran will push
on with  its  uranium enrichment  programme.  Tensions  in  the  region  will  only  grow,
destabilising its political and security environment further. Not having a nuclear deal in
hand is in no one’s interest. The EU should concentrate its e�orts to facilitate the return
of parties to the nuclear deal, enhance regional dialogue further, and help build a stable
regional security architecture.
Mihai Sebastian Chihaia is a Policy Analyst of the Europe in the World programme.
Amanda Paul is a Senior Policy Analyst of the Europe in the World programme.
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The  support  the  European  Policy  Centre  receives  for  its  ongoing  operations,  or
speci�cally for its publications, does not constitute an endorsement of their contents,
which re�ect the views of the authors only. Supporters and partners cannot be held
responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.
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